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This paper argues that the emergence of knowledge hierarchies in the
modern U.S. ￿rms since the late 19th century, expedited by huge progress
in communication technology, played a signi￿cant role in the expansion of
mass secondary education called the high school movement in the U.S. in the
early 20th century. To analyze the causal connections among these historical
events, the paper presents a dynamic model in which the complementarity
between individual skills is crucial to production. Middle-skilled individuals
could help increase the payo⁄ to the high-skilled by supervising low-skilled
production workers as middle managers in ￿rms, and so some of poten-
tial top managers with high skill actively supported the expansion of mass
education to the secondary level some time after a sophisticated form of pro-
duction organizations had started to emerge. This theoretical explanation
is consistent with the existing historical evidence in the literature.
Keywords: High School Movement, Communication Technology, Skill
Complementarity, Knowledge Hierarchies, Middle Managers, Public Sec-
ondary Education
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D20, I20, O10, O40
0Brown University (Se-Um_Kim@brown.edu). I am highly indebted to Oded Galor,
my main advisor, for his cordial guidance throughout the project and his constructive
criticisms that have helped improve the quality of the paper signi￿cantly. I especially
thank him for his patience while I was stuck in the middle of the project. I am also highly
obliged to Peter Howitt and David Weil for their valuable comments and guidance as my
advisors. I also thank Eren Arbatli, Quamrul Ashraf, Daeho Kim, Hernando Zuleta and
other seminar participants at Brown University for their helpful comments and genuine
interest in my paper. All remaining errors are mine.1 Introduction
In the early 20th century, more speci￿cally from 1910 to 1940, the U.S.
went through a great expansion in public secondary education called the
high school movement, which had never been witnessed in any other coun-
tries before and would not be matched by the other parts of the world
for several decades (Goldin, 1999).1 This paper presents a formal dynamic
model to analyze what economic incentive gave rise to this unprecedented
and unparalleled expansion of secondary education.
To ￿nd an answer to why the high school movement in the U.S. began in
the early 20th century, this paper focuses on the emergence of knowledge hi-
erarchies in the modern U.S. ￿rms in the late 19th century, as documented in
detail by Chandler (1977). He argues that the huge progress in communica-
tion technology, which had originated from the introduction of the railroad,
the telegraph and the telephone in the mid 19th century, contributed to the
emergence of multi-layered ￿rms where the role of the middle management
was important in bridging the top management and production workers.2
In addition, Chandler (1977) points out that the emergence of knowledge
hierarchies in Europe and Japan was neither as extensive nor as early as that
in the U.S.,3 implying that the emergence of knowledge hierarchies was also
1Goldin (1998) also writes that ￿not only was the high school movement from 1910 to
1940 a uniquely-American phenomenon, the secondary school as we know it today was a
uniquely-American invention￿ (p. 350). In addition, Table 1 in Goldin (1998) provides
vivid statistical testimony of the drastic e⁄ect of the high school movement on the huge
increase in the number of high school graduates. It shows that 61.4% of the cohort of men
born in 1926-1930 completed secondary education, and so did 80.9% of the cohort of men
born in 1946-1950. This is in stark constrast with 16.9% completion rate of the cohort
born in 1886-1890.
2Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) formalize the idea of Chandler (1977) with a
simpli￿ed model based on Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b). Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006a), however, presents a model in which there are only two skill levels and
so the role of middle managers is not explicitly considered.
3"In Europe and Japan, however, the new institution appeared in smaller numbers and,
at least until after World War II, spread more slowly than it did in the United States.
Because it came slower and later, its builders and administrators have often looked to the
American experience for models and precedents" (p. 498). As speci￿c examples of the
emergence of knowledge hierarchies in the U.S. much earlier than in Europe and Japan, he
mentions the American Tobacco Company, meat-packing companies such as Armour and
Swift, light-machinery makers such as Singer Sewing Machine and McCormick Harvester,
2a phenomenon unique to the U.S. similarly to the high school movement.4
On the other hand, Goldin (1999) points out that the great expansion
of public secondary education in the U.S. from 1910 to 1940 was adaptation
￿to the needs of the modern workplace of the early twentieth century￿(p.
S69) and that ￿the impetus to expand education to the secondary level was
primarily a grassroots movement led by parents, employers, and even young
people themselves￿(p. S71). Furthermore, although Goldin and Katz (2000)
stop short of saying that the economic incentive of potential top managers in
multi-layered ￿rms was the main driving force of the high school movement,5
they point out that ￿the growth of big business, as described by Alfred
Chandler, increased the demand for managers￿and that ￿Compared with
businesses in other industrial countries, American large-scale manufacturing
was distinctive in its heavy reliance on skilled managers for decision making
rather than shop-￿ oor craftsmen￿(pp. 791-792).6
Combining the above elements together, this paper argues that the emer-
gence of knowledge hierarchies in the U.S. in the late 19th century played
a signi￿cant role in promoting the remarkable high school movement in the
U.S. in the early 20th century, as potential top managers of multi-layered or-
ganizations, who wanted to enjoy high economic payo⁄s with the formation
of knowledge hierarchies, actively supported the expansion of mass educa-
tion to the secondary level to have su¢ cient middle managers required for
running optimal multi-layered organizations.7 To make this argument more
and heavy-machinery nakers such as General Electric and Westinghouse.
4This observation gives strong support to this paper￿ s attempt to connect by causality
the emergence of knowledge hierarchies in the late 19th century and the expansion of mass
secondary education in the early 20th century; if one historical event unique to the U.S.
has caused the other event, then this event will remain unique to the U.S. for some time,
too.
5They write, ￿We can infer, from the evidence just presented, that structural changes
in the economy around 1900 increased the relative demand for workers with a high school
education. Even though we do not have direct evidence that the high school movement
began because of an increase in educational returns, we can estimate returns in 1914 at
the start of the high school movement in an educational leader ￿Iowa￿(p. 793).
6They do not present a theoretical model to connect this point with the high school
movement, however.
7Evidence that jobs of middle managers really required high school education is pro-
vided by Goldin (1999) as follows: ￿Ordinary white-collar jobs customarily had an entry
3convincing, inspired by Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b),8 this paper formulates a dynamic
model in which middle managers with the middle level of skill could help
increase the earnings of the top managers with the high level of skill, by su-
pervising low-skilled production workers and thereby allowing the top man-
agers to avoid facing routine problems raised by the workers and specialize
in the most di¢ cult tasks.9
This paper is related mainly to three strands of the literature. First, this
paper serves as a complement to Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), which fo-
cuses on positive externalities from human capital, and Galor and Moav
(2006),10 which emphasizes the complementarity between physical and hu-
man capital as incentives for rich capitalists to support the introduction of
public education.11 We present a formal dynamic model that focuses on the
complementarity between individual skills made signi￿cant by huge progress
in communication technology and the emergence of knowledge hierarchies, as
requirement of several years of high school or a high school diploma, whereas most ordinary
production work had no such entry requirement in the 1900-1920s era￿(p. S81).
8These papers formulate static models rather than dynamic ones, not considering an
intergenerational connection.
9Although the model focuses only on the rise of middle managers as a cause of the high
school movement, this paper should not be misunderstood as arguing that that was the
only empirically signi￿cant cause of the event. Rather this paper should be understood
as an attempt to present another possible candidate, which is shown to be signi￿cant in
theory, for explanatory variables on the right hand side of a regression equation.
10Closely related to Galor and Moav (2006) is the literature of a uni￿ed growth theory,
which tries to explain the very long-run movement of key economic variables throughout
human history in a single framework. See Galor and Moav (2004), Galor, Moav and Voll-
rath (2008), and Murtin (2008) for studies focusing on a similar period to that considered
in this paper. A thorough and much detailed review of the literature of a uni￿ed growth
theory is presented in Galor (2005).
11As another complement to this literature, Galiani, Heymann, Dabus and Tohme (2008)
argue that in the case of land-rich economies such as Latin American countries, the need to
have skilled workers working for the human-captial-intensive service sector was the main
motive for the rich elite to support public education. On the other hand, as an antithesis
to the literature, Kochar (2008) shows that in the case of underdeveloped countries such as
India, litte interest in sustaining decent public education is due to the fact that an increase
in the poor￿ s schooling causes a hike in their wages, thereby leading to a decline in the
rich￿ s pro￿ts. Another study with a slightly di⁄erent focus is Su (2006), which analyzes
whether basic or higher education is more emphasized in public budget allocation chosen
exclusively by the privileged class depending on the development stage.
4strong economic incentives for potential high-income earning top managers
to support the expansion of mass education.12 Second, this paper is hugely
indebted to the literature that either empirically describes or theoretically
explains the emergence of multi-layered knowledge hierarchies in the U.S.
in the late 19th century. Chandler (1977) gives a very detailed and exten-
sive description of the emergence of knowledge hierarchies in the U.S. in the
late 19th century caused by the huge progress in communication technology,
which had originated from the introduction of the railroad, the telegraph
and the telephone in the mid-19th century. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006a) presents a formal static model consistent with Chandler￿ s (1977)
description of the emergence of knowledge hierarchies, based on another sta-
tic model presented in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b). Antras et al.
(2008) provides another static model of knowledge hierarchies in the context
of o⁄shoring, which we extend to a dynamic overlapping-generations setting
while also endogenizing the proportion of each skill level among the popu-
lation in the equilibrium that is assumed to be exogenous in their model.13
Third, as an empirical basis of our theoretical model we rely on the exten-
sive empirical literature that testi￿es the historical signi￿cance of the high
school movement in the U.S. in the early 20th century such as Goldin (1998,
12To our best knowledge, no theoretical model in the literature has considered the
complementarity between individual skills as an incentive for (potentially) rich people to
support mass education, although Goldin and Katz (2000) have already suggested that the
emergence of knowledge hierarchies as documented by Chandler (1977) was connected to
the increase in the demand for educated managers in the early 20th century. The closest
theoretical work to this paper might be Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), which argues that
the introduction of child labor regulation was the product of con￿ ict between unskilled
adult workers who would earn higher wages by restricting child labor and skilled adult
workers whose wages would be decreased due to less supply of unskilled workers to work
with if child labor regulation was introduced. However, they just assume that production
is carried out by using both skilled and unskilled labor as inputs, not considering the
formation of organizations. On the other hand, a study by Rajan and Zingales (2005)
considers a model in which oligarchs own frims and need to hire managers and laborers
who are complementary to each other, but they do not explicitly consider the formation of
optimal production organizations either and reach the conclusion that reforms increasing
access to education are very hard to implement unless the initial distribution of factor
endowments is favorable.
13Knowledge hierarchies considered in Saint-Paul (2007) are distinct from those consid-
ered in the above-mentioned studies, in that communication in his model takes place in a
top-down, not a bottom-up way as in other studies mentioned.
51999 & 2001) and Goldin and Katz (1997, 2000 & 2001).
This paper is structured as follows. The basic structure of our theoret-
ical model based on the literature mentioned earlier is presented in Section
2. The evolution of the model economy depending on the exogenous im-
provements in communication technology is described in Sections 3, 4 and
5, in which main results of the paper are summarized in ￿ve propositions.
The results in Sections 3 and 4 show that public secondary education is
not implemented yet in the political equilibrium when communication tech-
nology has not been improved enough and so the most sophisticated form
of knowledge hierarchies, for which a three-layered ￿rm is the proxy in our
model, does not emerge yet. Section 5 analyzes the evolution of the economy
when communication technology has been so much improved that the most
sophisticated form of knowledge hierarchies ￿nally emerges. In Subsection
5.1 we show that public secondary education is still not implemented in the
political equilibrium when there is no support yet from those who want to be
top managers in three-layered ￿rms and hire the optimal number of middle
managers. In Subsection 5.2, however, we show that public secondary edu-
cation starts to be implemented when there is enough extra support from
those who want to be top managers in three-layered ￿rms and employ the
optimal number of middle managers, as a result of a su¢ cient increase in
top managers￿wages and so a strong incentive to have enough middle-skilled
individuals in the economy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Basic Structure of the Model
Inspired by Galor and Moav (2006), this paper considers an overlapping-
generations economy in which individuals live for two periods and are en-
dowed with one unit of time per period. Each parent has one child and
each child has only one parent, and so there is no change in the number of
people per generation over time. In addition to agents￿age, there are two
more varieties of heterogeneity among individuals: innate ability and family
wealth. We assume for simplicity that innate ability of a child is determined
independently of her parent￿ s ability and wealth.
62.1 Formation of Production Organizations
This subsection addresses the evolution of the prevailing form of produc-
tion organizations depending on the exogenous progress in communication
technology, extending the static setup in Antras et al. (2008) to a dynamic
context.14 Following Antras et al. (2008) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006a, 2006b), production in each period is carried out using labor and
knowledge in competitive environments. Agents optimally choose to produce
together in a team or remain self-employed, and each production worker and
self-employed agent draws one unit measure of problems per unit of produc-
tion time, which coincides with the second period of her life in our model.
Output y is normalized to the measure of problems solved. An individual
i with skill zi 2 (0;1) can solve a proportion zi of the problems that she
faces randomly. Knowledge is cumulative in the sense that an individual
with higher skill is able to solve every problem that another individual with
lower skill can solve.
While a self-employed agent i with skill zi 2 (0;1) enjoys expected in-
come yi = zi, agents in teams can communicate their knowledge and help
others solve problems. First, each of production workers draws one unit
measure of problems to be solved, and they ask middle managers15 to help
with problems that they cannot solve for themselves. After trying to solve
those problems, middle managers ask the top manager to help with problems
that even they cannot solve. Communication between di⁄erent layers of a
￿rm forces higher-ranked managers to incur costs in terms of time spent.
To incorporate into our model the progress in communication technology
over time that made the emergence of knowledge hierarchies possible as
documented by Chandler (1977), and also to serve our main purpose of
￿guring out the technological origins of the high school movement in a simple
way, we make the following assumption: the time cost of communication
14The results in this subsection are not summarized in propositions or lemmas since
most of them are rather straightforward extensions of the setup in Antras et al. (2008).
15Antras et al. (2008) use the term middle managers in the context of o⁄shoring, as
managers in production facilities in host countries who help minimize the cost of trans-
mitting knowledge across borders. In contrast, this paper uses the term more generally
for intermediate layers of managers in any knowledge hierarchies.
7between ranks in a team in time t is ht 2 (0;1), and there is an exogenous




, t = 0;1;2;￿ ￿ ￿, (1)
where a constant g satis￿es 0 < g < 1.1617
For simplicity, assume that there are three ￿xed levels of problem-solving
skill, the learning technology of which will be speci￿ed in the next subsection:
0 < zl < zm < zh < 1: (2)
With the three levels of skill speci￿ed above, it is straightforward to
see that it cannot be optimal to have two agents with the same skill level
working in di⁄erent ranks of a team or to have subordinates with higher skill
than their managers￿ . This is because managers would not help increase
the output of subordinates, while only the production costs would rise by
their wages. So there are only three forms of production possible: three-
layered teams, two-layered teams, and self-employment, which are proxies
for the most sophisticated form of knowledge hierarchies, the prototypical
and less sophisticated one, and the production outside knowledge hierarchies
in reality respectively.
For example in a three-layered team, nl(1 ￿ zl) problems are asked to
be solved by middle managers per unit of time, where nl is the number of
production workers in an organization and zl is the skill level of produc-
tion workers. Since managers optimally join organizations with the exact
number of production workers that fully consumes all their time, it must
be that nlht(1 ￿ zl) = nm, where nm is the number of middle managers in
an organization. After middle managers try to solve the problems referred
to them by production workers, nl(1 ￿ zm) problems still remain unsolved
16Another way to interpret Equation 1 is to think of it as capturing the sequence of
incremental secondary innovations caused by an initial drastic innovation (Helpman, 1998),
in the forms of the railroad, the telegraph and the telephone.
17Antras et al. (2008) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a, 2006b) consider static
models and conduct comparative static analysis with respect to communication costs, as
opposed to explicitly considering a decrease in costs over time in a dynamic model.
8and are asked to be solved by the top manager, where zm is the skill level of
middle managers. So it must be that nlht(1￿zm) = 1 for a similar reason to
the above, and the ￿nal output of the ￿rm is given by nlzh, where zh is the
skill level of the top manager.18 Note that the optimal numbers of middle
managers and production workers for each top manager of a ￿rm is given
by nm =
1￿zl
1￿zm and nl = 1
ht(1￿zm) apiece, and output of a three-layered ￿rm,
given by
zh
ht(1￿zm); increases over time as ht decreases exogenously.19
Denoting the earnings of production workers, middle managers and the
top manager by wl, wm and wh respectively, the zero pro￿t condition with
perfect competition and the above two conditions for optimal team formation
imply that the wages of the top manager in a three-layered organization is
given by
wh = nlzh ￿ nlwl ￿ nmwm (3)
=
zh ￿ zl ￿ zmht(1 ￿ zl)
ht(1 ￿ zm)
,
which increases over time as top managers can hire a greater number of pro-
duction workers with communication costs declining. Note that the optimal
ratio between ranks in an organization is ￿xed by parameters, and so if the
proportion of zh among the whole population is low enough, then wm = zm
18￿Note the source of complementarity between skills in our model: An able top manager
increases the productivity of all workers in the team. The more knowledgeable subordi-
nates, the larger the team and the more can managers leverage their knowledge￿(Garicano
& Rossi-Hansberg, 2006b, p. 8).
19This increase in the number of production workers working in and output of a ￿rm
with ht decreasing over time, is also consistent with the introduction of a wider variety of
general purpose technologies (GPTs) than just communication technology as emphasized
in this paper. GPTs can be widely used in various sectors, leading to productivity growth
in the overall economy (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). For example, Rosenberg (1963)
emphasizes the role of the general-purpose machine tool industry as "a transmission center
in the di⁄usion of the new technology" (p. 426) in American industrialization, while David
(1990) focuses on the electric dynamo as a "general purpose engine" around which "the
evolution of techno-economic regimes formed" (p. 355). We continue to focus on huge
progress in communication technology as the main source, however, for the consistency
of our analysis with Chandler (1977). See Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), Aghion and
Howitt (1998) and Howitt (1998) for formal models analyzing the macroeconomic e⁄ects
of GPTs.
9and wl = zl as some individuals with zm and zl remain self-employed outside
the organizations.20
Now consider a two-layered organization in which a high-skilled individ-
ual is the manager and low-skilled individuals work as production workers.
By optimal team formation, it must be that nlht(1￿zl) = 1, and if there is a
su¢ ciently low proportion of zh, wl = zl. Then by the zero pro￿ts condition,





which increases over time as high-skilled managers can hire a greater number
of production workers with communication costs declining. Every middle-
skilled individual is self-employed in this scenario and earns zm: Note that
output produced by this type of two-layered ￿rm is given by
zh
ht(1￿zl), which
is obviously less than
zh
ht(1￿zm), output of a three-layered ￿rm considered
above.21
In addition to the above form of two-layered organizations, it might be
possible that a high-skilled individual forms a two-layered organization with
middle-skilled individuals. In this case, we can derive the following:











ht(1￿zl)(1￿zm) > 0 and so the
latter form of a two-layered organization cannot arise in an equilibrium. In
addition, we ignore the case of a two-layered organization made up of a
20In fact we do not need to care about whether there are su¢ cient low-skilled individuals
in the economy, because as will be discussed in detail in Section 4, we can assume that
there is always a huge potential in￿ ux of immigrants who want to come to and work in
the economy whenever excess demand for production workers arises.
21It is also obvious that output of a self-employed individual is always dominated by
output of any type of a production organization.
10middle-skilled individual and low-skilled individuals, which can be justi￿ed
by assuming that higher education required to obtain high skill is essential
for providing leadership skill to a leader of an organization.22 As a result, we
can focus only on three forms of production: self-employment, a two-layered
organization in which a high-skilled individual is the manager and low-skilled
individuals work as production workers, and a three-layered organization in
which a high-skilled individual is the top manager, middle-skilled individuals
are middle managers and low-skilled individuals are production workers.
Now we can ￿gure out which form of production prevails in the economy
with exogenous progress in communication technology over time. First note
that regardless of the form of production, earnings of the middle-skilled
and the low-skilled remain the same.23 So only the preferences of the high-
skilled determine which mode of production prevails in an equilibrium. For
the payo⁄ to the self-employed high-skilled to be lower than that to the










On the other hand, for the payo⁄ to the manager of a two-layered ￿rm





zh ￿ zl ￿ zmht(1 ￿ zl)
ht(1 ￿ zm)
, (8)
22Or we might assume that high school graudates have hard time funding setup costs of
an organization under severe capital market imperfections that we consider in this paper.
23It will be shown that the number of the middle-skilled is always enough to leave
some of them self-employed without public secondary education. After public schooling is
introduced, Kim (2008) shows, selective college admission can be used to make sure that
there are enough middle-skilled individuals in the economy. As will be explained in more
detail in Section 4, we can assume a constant in￿ ux of immigrants into the economy so
that there are always enough low-skilled individuals.
11which implies that
ht ￿
(zh ￿ zl)(zm ￿ zl)
zm(1 ￿ zl)2 ￿ h￿￿: (9)
We can also easily show that h￿￿ < h￿24. Note that wh keeps increasing
over time with the sophistication of organizational forms and the exogenous
decrease in ht, while payo⁄s to the middle-skilled and the low-skilled remain
constant regardless of time and occupational choices.25 This implies that
aggregate output in the economy keeps increasing as far as there is no big
change in the proportion of each skill level among the population. So output
growth in our model is rather trivial as it is mainly driven by the exogenous
progress in communication technology over time.
In summary, the forms of production chosen by the high-skilled evolve
with the decrease in communication costs over time as shown in Figure 1.
2.2 Individuals
We consider an OLG economy where individuals live for two periods. There
is a constant number of individuals in each generation, as each family is
made up of one parent and one child and so there is no population growth
over time. In the ￿rst period of their lives, individuals devote their entire
time to education.26 In the second period of their lives, individuals are self-
employed or work for a team as production workers, middle managers or the
top manager, depending on their optimal career choices.










25In reality, the rate of return to secondary education would increase as demand for
the middle-skilled by ￿rms increased. Goldin (1999) shows that education-skill premium
for middle managers had been very high before World War I, although it decreased after
1920 as a result of an increase in the supply of high school graduates with the high school
movement going on. While one might be able to come up with a di⁄erent formal model
from ours that captures that e⁄ect too, for simplicity we rather focus only on potential
top managers￿demand itself as the main cause of the introduction of public secondary
education. Considering the rate-of-return-to-education channel additionaly, while making
the analysis less tractable, might make it easier to derive the main results of our paper.
26For simplicity, ￿rst period consumption of an individual is abstracted from. It may
be thought of as included in her parent￿ s consumption.
12level of formal education.27 Assume that each individual i is endowed with
one of two levels of ability: ah and al, denoting high and low ability respec-
tively. We focus on secondary education as the level of formal education
with which one￿ s own innate ability makes the most di⁄erence in her skill
level after graduation,28 and the term high ability in our model is used to
indicate the level of competence required to take full advantage of secondary
education, the meaning of which will be made clear below. We also assume
for simplicity that innate ability of a child is determined independently of
her parent￿ s ability and wealth. Denote the proportion of individuals with
high ability among the population by q and that of those with low ability
by 1 ￿ q, which stay constant over time.
Also denote three levels of formal education by eh; em and el, which rep-
resent the completion of higher education, secondary education and elemen-
tary education, respectively.29 Then zi, each individual￿ s level of problem-





zh if ei = eh;
zm if ai = ah and ei = em;
zl if ei = el or if ai = al and ei = em:
(10)
Since we use the term high ability as meaning the level of competence
necessary to take full advantage of secondary schooling, only individuals with
27Antras et al. (2008) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) assume that the supply
of skill is exogenously given, while Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) consider endoge-
nous learning of knowledge. However, what they consider is not so much formal education
as on-the-job training, as they assume that the learning costs are paid to employees by
the ￿rm and that the learning costs are equivalent to the cost of processing information
decided by factors such as the improvements in the speed of microprocessors. In contrast,
this paper, as shown below, explicitly considers endogenous skill formation through formal
education, thereby making it possible to consider the e⁄ect of the emergence of knowledge
hierarchies on the high school movement in the early 20th century.
28Needless to say, one would be able to ￿nd examples in the real world implying that the
innate ability of college graduates also makes a di⁄erence in their skill as top managers.
The determination of skill levels presented in (10) below, however, is the simplest possible
way to incorporate into our dynamic model the fact that a high school graduate has few
ways to overcome the de￿cit in one￿ s own ability, while a college graduate has many ways
to do so.
29It is assumed that there is no dropout for simplicity.
13high ability can acquire the middle level of skill with secondary education.
This implies that individuals with ai = al can never be middle managers
in a three-layered organization. Some of them who are lucky enough to
go to college thanks to having wealthy parents become top managers, as
they can take advantage of close connections with other talented college
graduates fostered during and after their college years and so their skill
levels can be thought of as high regardless of their own innate ability.30
However, the others who are not as fortunate become production workers
or self-employed with a low level of skill. This implication of (10) seems
to be consistent with the reality despite its simplicity.31 A key assumption
regarding q, the proportion of high ability individuals, is such that with
high school education only the minority of the population can master the
skill level required of middle managers in a three-layered organization, but
that a large enough proportion of people can enjoy the bene￿t of secondary
education in that q is not too small, either.32 This assumption will be
30These connections between the alumni of a college can be either those between private
business executives and government o¢ cials, or those among business executives in trades
complementary to one another. Another potential way for untalented college graduates to
enjoy high payo⁄s is by dynastic management, studied by Caselli and Gennaioli (2005a,
2005b). Since descendants of rich families are overrepresented among college graduates as
will be shown later, many of them have parents who own production facilities and hand
them down to their o⁄springs. In this process know-how to run a ￿rm e⁄ectively can
also be handed down, implying that many college graduates with wealthy parents have
signi￿cant advantages over the others. In addition they might be able to take advantage
of their parents￿connections with other people, too.
31The reason that any connections among high school alumni are not enough to overcome
the de￿cit in one￿ s innate ability is as follows: while top managers focus on general man-
agement problems that do not necessarily hinge on their own speci￿c working skills, the
tasks for white-collar middle managers usually require speci￿c individual working skills.
For example, a middle manager with a problem typewriting documents fast enough, would
not be able to rely on any connections with her high school alumni to ￿x the problem
and so an individual with low ability has few ways to overcome her handicap to become
a middle manager.
32Assuming that the proportion q can be arbitrarily large would entail a criticism that
the introduction of public secondary education in our model is rather trivial, as the bene￿t
of the high school movement would be just assumed to spread among arbitrarily many
people. To avoid this potential criticism we impose the limit that the proportion q is less
than
1
2. On the other hand, while avoiding the above-mentioned criticism is important,
we need to have a lower limit of q so that our model can predict the introduction of public
secondary education, which is of course consistent with the historical facts. Since high
ability in this paper refers to the level of competence to take full advantage of secondary
14formalized in (A1) later.
It is assumed that elementary schooling was already universal at t = 0
and that elementary schooling costs zero for simplicity.33 However, sec-
ondary schooling costs K1 per individual, and that cost can be publicly
funded or paid by the student as tuition. Every individual who optimally
chooses to get secondary education is given a chance to go to high school
under public education or if they pay full tuition without public educa-
tion. When public secondary education is implemented, each individual i
should pay ￿tbi
t in the ￿rst period of her life, where ￿t is the common tax
rate for funding public education and bi
t is intergenerational transfer from
her parent.3435 So the decision to implement public secondary education is
equivalent to the decision to raise positive tax by a majority vote in which
every individual of the old generation participates in each period.36 For
education and not that to become professional economists or brain surgeons, assuming
that high ability individuals are not too few totally makes sense.
33The ￿rst transformation of American education took place in the mid 19th century in
the form of the expansion of elementary schooling (Goldin, 1998).
34We assume for simplicy that tax for funding public education is levied on intergen-
erational transfer, not the second period income of each parent speci￿ed below. Since
parental transfer is shown below to be a ￿xed proportion of the second period income,
introducing more general income tax would only make the analysis more complicated,
without leading to any changes in the qualitative results of this paper.
35This paper regards the public provision of education as the only way of redistributing
resources in the economy. See Levy (2005) for the implications of a political economic
model, in which income redistribution is another redistributive policy tool available in
addition to the public provision of education, for the formation of political coalitions and
the resultant policies.
36Why does every individual￿ s preference count when it is decided whether to introduce
public secondary education? The answer is that the decision on public secondary educa-
tion, as will be made clear below, has potential to a⁄ect the educational and occupational
choices of everyone regardless of her ability and the amount of bequests received from her
parent, in addition to the fact that everyone in the economy needs to share the costs of
secondary education once public education starts to be implemented. This assumption
that a majority vote in which every individual, not just some previleged ones, participates
decides whether to introduce public secondary education, is consistent with the quotation
from Goldin (1999) in the Introduction that ￿the impetus to expand education to the
secondary level was primarily a grassroots movement led by parents, employers, and even
young people themselves￿(P. S71). Assuming that some group, who economically ben-
e￿ts from public secondary education, can have a decisive in￿ uence by lobbying, would
not change the qualitative results of this paper and might make the analysis much easier,
while causing controversy over not considering the democratic nature of American society.
It is assumed that in each period, each old individual votes on the issue of funding pub-
15simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two alternatives: no funding
with zero tax rate and full funding with ￿t = K1
bt , where bt is the average
level of parental transfer at time t.37
On the other hand, an individual should pay K2 (> K1) privately as
tuition for higher education.38 We assume that college admission is non-
selective and every individual who optimally demands college education and
can pay tuition is admitted.39 In addition, a rather extreme form of capital
market imperfections is assumed: for an individual i to get higher educa-
tion, she needs to have (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t ￿ K2 with public secondary education
implemented, and bi
t ￿ K1 to get secondary education without public sec-
ondary schooling.40 In other words, there is no borrowing for education,
which might not be very implausible for the periods on which the model
focuses.
lic education perfectly re￿ ecting her young child￿ s preference, being aware of her child￿ s
innate ability. This assumption is made to reconcile the majority vote with the utility
function presented below. It will get clear soon that, as for the vote on the issue of public
funding of schooling, there is no con￿ ict between a parent￿ s own consumption and the
transfer to her child and so the above assumption is not problematic.
37It should be noted that bt is the arithmetic mean, not the median of parental transfer
to avoid any confusion in later sections.
38K2 is in general di⁄erent from expenditure per student as there are other sources of
revenue for colleges such as alumni￿ s donations and income from their ￿nancial endow-
ments. We assume for simplicity that there is no ￿nancial aid, and so every student pays
the same amount of tuition. K2, the real value of college tuition, is also assumed to be
constant over time, which is equivalent to assuming that the increase in nominal college
tuition over time has been in line with the overall in￿ ation.
39This assumption is consistent with the historical fact that almost every applicant was
admitted even to highly prestigious colleges before the introduction of selective admission
criteria in the early 20th century (Karabel, 2005). As implied by the ￿xed amount of
tuition, the supply of education is assumed to be perfectly elastic and so every individ-
ual who optimally chooses to apply to college can be admitted paying K2 unless colleges
choose to adopt selective admission criteria. In other words, only the demand for edu-
cation determines the equilibrium education level in the economy unless selective college
admission is implemented, and this simpli￿cation allows us to focus on the incentive of
the general public to vote for public education. In addition, in an OLG model in which
one generation lasts for 30 years or more, the elasticity of supply of education must be
quite high, since the supply side has enough time to adjust for the time trend of demand.
40Galor and Zeira (1993) consider this type of non-convexity or indivisibility in human
capital investment under a less extreme form of capital market imperfections than ours,
focusing on the e⁄ect of inequality under capital market imperfections on human capital
investment and economic growth.
16In the second period of her life, each individual is self-employed or works
for a team as a production worker, a middle manager or a top manager,
depending on her optimal career choice. Denote second period income of an
individual i by Ii
t+1. For simplicity, it is assumed that the internationally
set interest rate is equal to zero for every period.41
Preferences of an individual i of a generation t, de￿ned over second period
consumption ci
t+1 and the transfer to her child bi
t+1, are represented by the
following homothetic, log-linear utility function:42
ui
t = (1 ￿ ￿)logci
t+1 + ￿ logbi
t+1; (11)
where ￿ 2 (0;1).
Then an individual optimally chooses her consumption and intergenera-





Solving the problem of maximizing (11) subject to (12) gives the optimal
consumption and transfer as follows:
ci




Then the indirect utility of the individual is given by
vi
t = log(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿￿￿Ii
t+1: (14)
Therefore, individuals care only about Ii
t+1, and choose ei given ai and
bi
t to maximize Ii
t+1, under the borrowing constraint in the ￿rst period.43
41We assume that individuals can lend any amount of money at this rate in the inter-
national capital market, although they cannot borrow anything under the extreme form
of capital market imperfections.
42This type of joy-of-giving preferences has been widely adopted in the recent literature
closely related to this paper, the representative one of which is Galor and Moav (2006).
43Although an individual cares only about maximizing second period income and then
just allocates the income for consumption and the transfer to her child in a ￿xed propor-
tion, she could be thought of as fully representing her child￿ s interest in the majority vote
on public education because the vote involves no con￿ ict between her own consumption
173 The Era of Everybody being Self-employed (h￿ <
ht+1 ￿ h0)
With the basic structure of the model presented in Section 2, now we can
proceed to see whether public secondary education arises in each stage of
the progress in communication technology. In the ￿rst stage in which com-
munication costs are so high that production in organizations is not carried
out yet, everybody is self-employed as shown in Figure 1 and so yi = zi,
i = h;m;l.






denotes a threshold level of bequests over which one can a⁄ord to get higher
education with public secondary education implemented. Also assume that
bt > K1, t = 0;1;2;￿ ￿ ￿, which implies that capital market imperfections are
mainly binding on college education. Then we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1 K1 < bt < K1 + K2 < b bt if and only if bt < K1 + K2, and
K1 < b bt < K1 + K2 < bt if and only if bt > K1 + K2:
Proof. i) (K1 + K2) ￿ b bt = (K1 + K2) ￿ K2





< 0 i⁄ bt < K1 + K2;
> 0 i⁄ bt > K1 + K2:
ii) bt￿b bt = bt￿ K2






< 0 i⁄ bt < K1 + K2;
> 0 i⁄ bt > K1 + K2:
iii) b bt ￿ K2
1￿￿t > K1 is obvious. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 shows that as the average level of bequests in the economy
increases, the tax rate for funding public secondary education decreases and
so individuals with less bequests can a⁄ord to get college education than
before.
Now assume that bt < K1+K2 during this period, which implies that an
average individual su⁄ers from capital market imperfections.44 The second
period income of an individual i with ai = ah, depending on her education
and her child￿ s welfare.
44Note that the average individual is an individual with the arithmetic mean level of
bequests, not one with the median level.
18level chosen and with the borrowing constraint ignored for the moment, is
given as follows:
i) ei = eh ! Ii
t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zh + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2
without public education,








t ￿ K1 without public education,
zm + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




t without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education,










t ￿ K1 if bi
t < bt;
< bi
t ￿ K1 if bi
t > bt:
Note that no individual with high ability would be willing to get only ele-
mentary schooling with public secondary education implemented, since indi-
viduals need to pay the tax regardless of whether they attend high school.45
Before ￿guring out the preferences of individuals for public education de-
pending on their wealth inherited from their parents, we make the following
assumption, which implies that acquiring one-step higher skill is worthwhile
if one has high ability, and those with high ability are neither the majority
nor too few among the population:
zh > zm + K2, (A1)
zm > max
n











< q < q,
45This results from the fact that the ￿rst period of one￿ s life is entirely devoted to
education in the model. If some fraction of the ￿rst period can be spent supplying labor,
then some individuals might optimally choose to participate in the labor market as soon
as they graduate from elementary school.
19where q ￿
￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2
4(1 ￿ zl)
:46
The following lemma shows that 2￿
p
2
2 < q < 1
2 is always satis￿ed given




q < q and people with high ability must be the minority. The proof is
relegated to the Appendix.






￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p






With zh > zm + K2 and zm > zl + K1 as assumed in (A1) and given
Lemma 1 and capital market imperfections, we obtain Figure 2 based on
(15), in which solid lines represent second period income of high ability
individuals for each level of bequests and education under the borrowing
constraint. Note that we consider both a case in which public education
is implemented and the other case in which there is no public education.
Lines representing the two cases for getting only elementary education are
omitted, as it is obvious from (15) that a rational individual with ai = ah
never prefers those options regardless of her wealth level.
For a given level of bi
t, one needs to consider only the best scenarios in
terms of second period income when she decides whether to vote for public
education. Therefore, we obtain the following preferences of high ability
agents on public education depending on bi
t:47
i) People with bi
t < bt vote for public education, hoping to get em.
ii) People with bi
t 2 [bt;K1 + K2) vote against public education, hoping
to get em.
iii) People with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 vote against public education, hoping to
get eh.





2 ￿ 3) ’ 0:0627; which must be less than zl + K1.
47It does not matter for individuals￿ voting preferences regarding public education,
whether the solid part of the "em without public education" line intersects that of the "eh
with public education" line in Figure 2.
20In the case of people with high ability, therefore, only relatively poor
individuals support public secondary education since they would enjoy the
bene￿t of becoming middle-skilled while paying less than the actual costs
of secondary education. On the other hand, relatively rich ones have no
incentive to vote for public schooling since they can pay less to get the same
levels of education without public education.
To determine whether public secondary education is implemented in this
period, we need to look at the preferences of people with low ability, too.
The second period income of an individual i with ai = al, depending on her
education level chosen and with the borrowing constraint ignored for the
moment, is given as follows:
i) ei = eh ! Ii
t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zh + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2
without public education,








t ￿ K1 without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




t without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.
With zh > zm + K2 and zm > zl + K1 as assumed in (A1), and given
Lemma 1 and capital market imperfections, we obtain Figure 3 based on
(16), a similar graph to Figure 2 but now for the preferences of low ability
individuals. Lines representing the other three cases are omitted as it is
obvious from (16) that a rational individual never prefers those options
regardless of her wealth level.
From Figure 3, we infer the following preferences of low ability agents
on public education depending on bi
t:48
48It does not matter for individuals￿ voting preferences regarding public education,
whether the solid part of the "el without public education" line intersects that of the
"eh with public education" line in Figure 3.
21i) People with bi
t < K1+K2 vote against public education, hoping to get
el.
ii) People with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 vote against public education, hoping to
get eh.
Therefore, people with low ability do not support public secondary ed-
ucation regardless of their wealth level. Non-rich ones vote against public
schooling because they cannot a⁄ord to get higher education anyway and
cannot become middle-skilled with secondary education, either. On the
other hand, rich individuals do not support public education because they
would pay less to get the same level of education without public schooling.
Before proceeding to see if public education is implemented during this
period, we ￿rst consider the evolution of bequests over time when public
education has never been implemented before. For this purpose, We de￿ne
the proportions of poor and rich people respectively at time 0 as follows:
￿P ￿ Pr(bi
0 2 [0;K1)); (17)
￿R ￿ Pr(bi
0 2 [K1 + K2;1)),
where an individual is considered poor if she cannot a⁄ord even secondary
schooling without public education implemented, while one is regarded as
rich if she can pay for college education without public funding.
We also assume the following inequalities among parameters of the model
so as to impose reasonable restrictions on the evolution of the level of be-
quests over time, and impose a restriction that the proportion of rich families
at time 0 is reasonably low:
K1 > ￿(zl + K1), K1 + K2 > ￿(zm + K2) > ￿K1 + K2, (A2)




Note that (A2) is de￿nitely consistent with (A1). For future use, we
present the following lemma regarding how small the upper limit of ￿R is.
22The lemma also shows that the inequality 0 ￿ ￿R < 1 ￿ 1
2q(2￿q) in (A2) is
not nonsense. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.





Consider now the distribution of skill without public secondary education
implemented based on Figures 2 and 3. People with ai = ah and bi
t < K1
are forced to choose el as their education level and so acquire zl as their skill
level. Individuals with ai = ah and bi
t 2 [K1;K1 + K2) choose em and so
acquire zm as their skill level. Agents with ai = ah and bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 want
to get eh and as a result acquire a skill level zh: On the other hand, people
with ai = al and bi
t < K1 + K2 choose el and acquire zl as their skill level.
Those with ai = al and bi
t ￿ K1 +K2 want to get eh and as a result acquire
a skill level zh: Hence there exist all three levels of skill in the equilibrium,
and self-employed individuals make earnings accordingly.
Given that bi
t+1 = ￿Ii
t+1 from Section 2, the equilibrium skill and payo⁄
distributions discussed above, and K1 > ￿(zl +K1), K1 +K2 > ￿(zm +K2)
and ￿zh > K1+K2 as assumed in (A2), we obtain Figure 4, a phase diagram
depicting the evolution of bi
t over time with public education having never
been implemented:49
Note that there are three intersections between the bi
t+1 = ￿Ii
t+1 graph
and the 45 degree line denoted by A, B and C in Figure 4. The ￿rst three
conditions in (A2), except that ￿(zm + K2) > ￿K1 + K2; make sure that
the ￿(zl + bi
t) line is located above the 45 degree line at bi
t = K1; that
the ￿(zm + bi
t ￿ K1) line is below the 45 degree line at bi
t = K1 + K2,
and that the ￿(zh + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2) line (and so the ￿(wh + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2)
line in later periods) is above the 45 degree line at bi
t = K1 + K2. This
con￿guration implies that without public secondary education implemented,
the long-run level of bequests for descendants of originally rich families (with
proportion ￿R) keeps increasing with wh increasing as a result of the decrease
in communication costs over time, while the long-run level of bequests for
49Of course wh in the ￿(wh + b
i
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2) needs to be replaced by zh in the period
considered in this section. We leave wh in Figure 4 so that we can refer to it in the
following sections in which high-skilled individuals work as top managers of ￿rms.
23descendants of originally non-rich families (with proportion 1￿￿R) oscillates
between points A and B in Figure 4. This prediction of high and increasing
inequality and low intergenerational mobility well ￿ts the reality without
public education.
Based on the above discussions, we present the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given (A1) and (A2), in the period when self-employment
prevails due to high communication costs, public secondary education is not
implemented:
Proof. From the above analysis, the only group of people who vote for the
introduction of public secondary education in this period are those who have
high ability but are relatively poor (ai = ah and bi
t < bt): The proportion of
those people, Pr(ai = ah and bi
t < bt) = q Pr(bi
t < bt) by the independence
between child￿ s ability and parental ability or wealth. Now suppose that
q Pr(bi
t < bt) ￿ 1
2, so as to show that this leads to a contradiction. From
Figure 4, it is clear that Pr(bi
t < bt) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿R as bt < K1 + K2 during
this period. Then q Pr(bi
t < bt) ￿ q(1 ￿ ￿R): As a result, it follows that
1
2 ￿ q Pr(bi
t < bt) ￿ q(1 ￿ ￿R) must hold. However, Since q < q < 1
2 from
(A1) and Lemma 2 proven based on (A1), and 0 ￿ ￿R < 1
2 from (A2)
and Lemma 3 proven based on (A1), q(1 ￿ ￿R) < 1
2 and so the inequality
1
2 ￿ q Pr(bi
t < bt) ￿ q(1 ￿ ￿R) cannot hold true. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that in the period when there is no demand for
middle managers working in a multi-layered organization, public secondary
education cannot be implemented. As the outcome of the majority vote
favors no public secondary education, the distribution of skill in the equilib-
rium shown above continues to hold. There exist all three levels of skill in
the equilibrium, and self-employed individuals make earnings accordingly.
4 The Era of Two-Layered Organizations (h￿￿ <
ht+1 ￿ h￿)
Before starting the main analysis of this section, we make a crucial simplify-
ing assumption that is consistent with long history of mass immigration into
24the U.S.: There is always a huge potential in￿ ux of immigrants who want to
come to and work in the economy whenever excess demand for production
workers arises, but who are willing to be excluded in the political process
at both the national and the local level. This assumption is consistent with
the history of immigration into the U.S. from the mid-19th century to the
mid-20th century, the period that we focus on. These immigrant workers,
regardless of the level of education that they had acquired in their native
countries, usually started working in blue-collar jobs when they ￿rst landed
in America while having few ways to make their voices heard in the political
process (Brogan, 2001).50 This assumption implies that we do not need to
care about whether there is a su¢ cient number of low-skilled individuals
required for forming optimal multi-layered organizations in the economy.
Based on the above assumption, in the period in which communication
costs have decreased enough that production in two-layered organizations
starts to emerge but three-layered organizations do not emerge yet, every
individual with zi = zh becomes the manager of a two-layered ￿rm and em-
ploys individuals with zi = zl (including immigrants) as production workers.
On the other hand, every individual with zi = zm in the economy becomes
self-employed and so do any individuals with zi = zl who are left out of
organizations. Then following the results from Section 2, earnings to each




, ym = zm, wl = zl: (18)
We still assume that bt < K1+K2 during this period, which implies that
an average individual still su⁄ers from capital market imperfections. Then
50In fact this type of immigration persists even into the 21st century, in the form of
hotly debated Hispanic illegal immigration. While most of the new immigrants contin-
ued to reside in the U.S. over the subsequent generations and so the demographic and
political dynamics have been signi￿cantly a⁄ected in a long haul, we choose not to focus
on the issue and assume that the total population in the economy remains unchanged.
Introducing exogenous population growth would not a⁄ect the qualitative results of the
political economy model that we consider. We also implicitly assume that the descendants
of the immigrants are fully integrated into the mainstream society and their preferences
on public education are identical to those of the original mainstream citizens.
25the second period income of an individual i with ai = ah, depending on her
education level chosen and with the borrowing constraint ignored for the
moment, is given as follows:
i) ei = eh ! Ii
t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zh￿zl
ht+1(1￿zl) + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2
without public education,
zh￿zl








t ￿ K1 without public education,
zm + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




t without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.
From (6) and (7),
zh￿zl
ht+1(1￿zl) ￿ zh during this period and so we obtain
exactly the same result regarding high ability individuals￿voting preferences
as we saw in Section 3:
i) People with bi
t < bt vote for public education, hoping to get em.
ii) People with bi
t 2 [bt;K1 + K2) vote against public education, hoping
to get em.
iii) People with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 vote against public education, hoping to
get eh.
The intuition for the above voting preferences depending on the level of
bequests is the same as in Section 3. Now consider the voting preferences of
people with low ability. The second period income of an individual i with
ai = al, depending on her education level chosen and with the borrowing
constraint ignored for the time being, is given as follows:
26i) ei = eh ! Ii
t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zh￿zl
ht+1(1￿zl) + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2
without public education,
zh￿zl








t ￿ K1 without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




t without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.
Noting that
zh￿zl
ht+1(1￿zl) ￿ zh during this period, we obtain exactly the
same result regarding low ability individuals￿voting preferences as we saw
in Section 3:
i) People with bi
t < K1+K2 vote against public education, hoping to get
el.
ii) People with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 vote against public education, hoping to
get eh.
The intuition for the above voting preferences depending on the level of
bequests is the same as in Section 3. Note that the only group of people
who vote for the introduction of public education are still those who have
high ability but are relatively poor (ai = ah and bi
t < bt), with the results
for both high and low ability individuals combined. Now we present the
following proposition, the proof of which is identical to that of Proposition
1:
Proposition 2 Given (A1) and (A2), in the period when two-layered pro-
duction organizations emerge but three-layered ￿rms do not due to an inter-
mediate level of communication costs, public secondary education is still not
implemented:
Proposition 2 shows that when there exists only a prototype of pro-
duction organizations in which middle managers are not important, public
27secondary education is still not implemented. As the outcome of the major-
ity vote favors no public education, we obtain exactly the same distribution
of skill in the equilibrium as in Section 3: people with ai = ah and bi
t < K1
are forced to choose el as their education level and so acquire zl as their skill
level. Individuals with ai = ah and bi
t 2 [K1;K1 + K2) choose em and so
acquire zm as their skill level. Those with ai = ah and bi
t ￿ K1+K2 want to
get eh and as a result acquire a skill level zh: On the other hand, people with
ai = al and bi
t < K1+K2 choose el and acquire zl as their skill level. Agents
with ai = al and bi
t ￿ K1 +K2 want to get eh and as a result acquire a skill
level zh: Hence there exist all three levels of skill in the equilibrium. It is
ensured that every individual with zi = zh forms a two-layered organization
with the optimal number of production workers nl = 1
ht+1(1￿zl) (See Section
2), because of the assumption that we have made at the beginning of this
section. Therefore, we do not need to care about whether the ratio of people
with ai = ah and bi
t < K1 or with ai = al and bi
t < K1 + K2 to those with
bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 is greater than 1
ht+1(1￿zl), as immigrant workers who do not
participate in the political process make up for any shortage of production
workers demanded by the high-skilled in the economy.
5 The Era of Three-Layered Organizations (ht+1 ￿
h￿￿)
In the period in which communication costs have ￿nally decreased enough
that production in three-layered organizations starts to emerge, every indi-
vidual with zi = zh becomes the top manager of a three-layered ￿rm and
employs individuals with zi = zm as middle managers and individuals with
zi = zl as production workers.51 On the other hand, some individuals with
zi = zm or zl who are left out of organizations become self-employed. Then
51With public secondary education having never been implemented, Proposition 4 below
shows that the ratio between the number of middle skilled individuals to that of high skilled
ones is greater than the optimal ratio of middle managers to the top manager in a three-
layered ￿rm. Even after the implementation of public secondary education, Kim (2008)
shows, selective college admission is su¢ cient for top managers to ￿nd enough middle
managers required for running optimal three-layered ￿rms.
28following the results from Section 2, earnings to each skill level is given by
wh =
zh ￿ zl ￿ zmht(1 ￿ zl)
ht(1 ￿ zm)
, wm = zm, wl = zl: (21)
5.1 Capital Market Imperfections Still Bind for an Average
Individual
First, consider the period during which bt < K1 + K2 still holds, as in the
previous two eras.52 Then the second period income of an individual i with
ai = ah, depending on her education level chosen and with the borrowing
constraint ignored for the moment, is given as follows:
i) ei = eh ! Ii
t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)
ht+1(1￿zm) + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2
without public education,
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)








t ￿ K1 without public education,
zm + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




t without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




ht+1(1￿zl) during this period and
so we obtain exactly the same result regarding high ability individuals￿vot-
ing preferences as we saw in Sections 3 and 4:
i) People with bi
t < bt vote for public education, hoping to get em.
ii) People with bi
t 2 [bt;K1 + K2) vote against public education, hoping
to get em.
52Since bt is the arithmetic mean level of bequests, not the median, one might think that
it is possible that bt < K1 + K2 had already stopped being satis￿ed in the previous era.
This would imply, however, that the introduction of public secondary education took place
one generation before the emergence of a sophisticated form of production organizations:
Seeing the emergence of a sophisticated form of ￿rms next period, the majority vote would
favor the introduction of public education in a similar way to Proposition 5 below. This
is obviously not consistent with the historical facts.
29iii) People with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 vote against public education, hoping to
get eh.
The intuition for the above voting preferences depending on the level of
bequests is the same as in Section 3. Now consider the voting preferences of
people with low ability. The second period income of an individual i with
ai = al, depending on her education level chosen and with the borrowing
constraint ignored for the time being, is given as follows:
i) ei = eh ! Ii
t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)
ht+1(1￿zm) + bi
t ￿ K1 ￿ K2
without public education,
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)








t ￿ K1 without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi
t with public education.




t without public education,
zl + (1 ￿ ￿t)bi





ht+1(1￿zl) during this period, we obtain
exactly the same result regarding low ability individuals￿voting preferences
as we saw in Sections 3 and 4:
i) People with bi
t < K1+K2 vote against public education, hoping to get
el.
ii) People with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 vote against public education, hoping to
get eh.
The intuition for the above voting preferences depending on the level of
bequests is the same as in Section 3. Note that the only group of people
who vote for the introduction of public education are still those who have
high ability but are relatively poor (ai = ah and bi
t < bt), with the results
for both high and low ability individuals combined. Now we present the
following proposition, the proof of which is identical to that of Proposition
1:
30Proposition 3 Given (A1) and (A2), in the period when three-layered ￿rms
￿nally emerge as a result of the lowering of communication costs but when
bt < K1 + K2 still holds with an implication that an average individual still
su⁄ers from capital market imperfections, public secondary education is still
not implemented:
Proposition 3 implies that even if there emerges a sophisticated form
of production organizations in which middle managers play a crucial role,
public secondary education might not be introduced immediately if the at-
tractiveness of being the top manager of a ￿rm is not that high to the
high-skilled and so they do not actively support public secondary educa-
tion yet. To see why, note that in our model bt increases over time because
the payo⁄ to top managers increases with the improvement in communica-
tion technology, while payo⁄s to the others remain unchanged. Therefore,
bt < K1 +K2 is equivalent to saying that the payo⁄ to top managers in the
economy is not that high yet, and so the risk of being forced to remain self-
employed and earning less than a top manager is not that high, either. This
means that there is no su¢ cient incentive for the high-skilled to support
public secondary education so that they can hire enough middle managers
required for running an optimal ￿rm. As a result, there is no support for
public education from potential top managers yet53 and this leads to public
education not being implemented in this period, which is consistent with the
time lag between the emergence of knowledge hierarchies in the late 19th
century and the high school movement in the early 20th century.
As the outcome of the majority vote favors no public secondary educa-
tion, we still obtain exactly the same distribution of skill in the equilibrium
as in Sections 3 and 4: people with ai = ah and bi
t < K1 are forced to
choose el as their education level and so acquire zl as their skill level. Peo-
ple with ai = ah and bi
t 2 [K1;K1 + K2) choose em and so acquire zm as
their skill level. Individuals with ai = ah and bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 want to get
eh and as a result acquire a skill level zh: On the other hand, agents with
53Remember that the only group of people who vote for the introduction of public
education in this period are those who have high ability but are relatively poor (ai = ah
and b
i
t < bt), and want to be middle-skilled with secondary education.
31ai = al and bi
t < K1 +K2 choose el and acquire zl as their skill level. Those
with ai = al and bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 want to get eh and as a result acquire a
skill level zh: Hence there exist all three levels of skill in the equilibrium.
As before we can count on the assumption of potential immigrants into the
economy to avoid a complicated consideration of the ratio of the number of
the low-skilled to that of the high-skilled in the economy. We cannot adopt
the same simplifying strategy, however, regarding the ratio of the number
of the middle-skilled to that of the high-skilled as new immigrants cannot
be expected to have the level of skill required of middle managers due to
either language barriers or cultural hardships.54 To ensure that every indi-
vidual with zi = zh can form a three-layered organization with the optimal
number of middle managers nm =
1￿zl
1￿zm (See Section 2), the ratio of the
number of people with ai = ah and bi
t 2 [K1;K1 + K2) to that of people
with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 needs to be greater than
1￿zl
1￿zm: Otherwise some fraction
of individuals with zi = zh cannot ￿nd enough middle managers that they
want to hire and as a result are forced to remain self-employed, su⁄ering the
decline of payo⁄s from
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)
ht+1(1￿zm) to zh.55
Now turn to the question of whether it is possible to have enough middle-
skilled individuals in the economy for three-layered organizations to function
optimally without public secondary education implemented. In fact we can
54Of course in reality we see some foreigners working as middle-managers or even in
better jobs. However, it seems that these cases are rather exceptions than a rule. Assuming
that new immigrants can be middle-skilled right after arriving in the economy would make
our analysis much simpler, while causing the same controversy as we have already pointed
out.
55To justify this assumption, we can think of the most e¢ cient organizational form
and the optimal ratios between ranks in organizations at the time as a social consensus
reached by every agent in the economy depending on the communication costs, and so
those speci￿c form and ratios at the time need to be strictly abided by. This implies
that those with zh during this period have only two alternatives: either becoming a top
manager in a three-layered organization with the optimal numbers of middle managers and
production workers employed, or remaining self-employed. Neither forming a two-layered
organization only with production workers nor running a three-layered organization with
suboptimal ratios between ranks is not possible. Qualitative results in this paper would
not change even if we allowed any form of suboptimal organizations to be formed by the
high-skilled who failed to ￿nd the optimal number of middle managers, so that they could
earn higher than zh but still less than
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)
ht+1(1￿zm) .
32show that it must be the case for a reasonable range of the proportion of
the people who are totally free of any borrowing constraints for education
at time 0, as given in (A2).
Proposition 4 Given (A1) and (A2), and considering the long run dis-
tribution of bequests when public education has never been implemented, the
ratio between the number of middle-skilled individuals and that of high-skilled
individuals in the economy is greater than the optimal ratio between middle
managers and the top manager in a three-layered ￿rm when bt < K1 + K2
holds.
Proof. From Figure 4, it is clear that in the long run with public ed-
ucation having never been implemented, the 1 ￿ ￿R proportion of people
are located in the interval bi
t 2 [K1;K1 + K2), while the ￿R proportion
of people are found in the interval bi
t 2 [K1 + K2;1). So when both
ht+1 ￿ h￿￿ and bt < K1 + K2 hold, the ratio between the number of






￿R , from the independence between child￿ s




1￿zm, where the RHS is the optimal ratio. We are to show that this leads to a
contradiction. It is straightforward to show that this inequality is equivalent
to ￿R ￿
(1￿zm)q
(1￿zl)+(1￿zm)q. From Lemma 3 proven based on (A1) 1￿ 1
2q(2￿q) <
(1￿zm)q




However, this contradicts ￿R < 1 ￿ 1
2q(2￿q) in (A2). Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 implies that if ￿R is small enough within a very reasonable
range as given in (A2), then people with a skill level zh have no problem
￿nding as many people with a skill level zm as they want to hire as middle
managers in ￿rms even without public secondary education. This implica-
tion strengthens the argument made in proposition 3 that in this period
potential top managers have no incentive whatsoever to support public ed-
ucation for the purpose of having enough middle-skilled individuals whom
they can hire as middle managers.
335.2 Capital Market Imperfections do not Bind Any More for
an Average Individual
Next, consider the period during which bt > K1 + K2 holds ￿nally, as an
average individual escapes from the borrowing constraint for education.56
Then from Lemma 1, we have K1 < b bt < K1 + K2 < bt , where b bt ￿ K2
1￿￿t.
Then the second period income of an individual i with ai = ah, depending
on her education level chosen and with the borrowing constraint ignored for
the moment, is exactly the same as in (22), but now Figure 5, which depicts
high ability individuals￿optimal choices, looks di⁄erent from Figure 2 due
to the change in the order of K1, K1 +K2, bt and b bt. Note that in Figure 5
lines representing the two cases for elementary education only are omitted
as it is obvious that a rational individual with ai = ah never prefers those
options regardless of her wealth level.
Based on Figure 5, we obtain the following preferences of high ability
agents depending on bi
t:
i) People with bi
t < b bt vote for public education, hoping to get em.
ii) People with bi
t 2 [b bt;bt) vote for public education, hoping to get eh.
iii) People with bi
t ￿ bt vote against public education, hoping to get eh.
In the case of people with high ability, relatively poor individuals are still
the only group who supports public secondary education since they would
enjoy the bene￿t of becoming middle-skilled or high-skilled while paying
less than the actual costs of secondary education. In contrast with what
happened in the previous periods, however, as secondary schooling costs
would decline with public secondary education implemented,57 those who
56Note that from Figure 4, bt keeps increasing as the payo⁄ to top managers keeps
increasing with the improvement in communication technology, while payo⁄s to others
remain unchanged. As a result, it is clear that even when an average individual with
the arithmetic mean level of bequests ￿nally escapes from the borrowing constraint, one
with the median level of bequests still su⁄ers from that (In fact everyone except a few
descendants of originally rich families does). Therefore, this paper does NOT argue that
for public secondary education to be implemented, a median individual had to totally
escape from the borrowing constraint for education.
57Note that b bt ￿
K2
1￿￿t keeps decreasing over time as ￿t =
K1
bt keeps decreasing with the
increase in bt. Therefore, once public secondary education is implemented, the costs of
secondary schooling (the tax) keeps decreasing and so an increasing number of relatively
34are moderately poor now do not want to stop at secondary schooling and
hope to get higher education under public secondary education, in the hope
of becoming top managers and hiring middle managers after graduation.
On the other hand, relatively rich ones have no incentive to vote for public
schooling since they can pay less to get the same level of education without
public schooling.
On the other hand, the second period income of an individual i with
ai = al, depending on her education level chosen and with the borrowing
constraint ignored for the time being, is also exactly the same as in (23), but
now Figure 6, which depicts low ability individuals￿optimal choices, looks
di⁄erent from Figure 3 for the same reason as mentioned above. Note that
lines representing the options that will never be preferred by any individual
with ai = al are omitted in Figure 6.
Based on Figure 6, we obtain the following preferences of low ability
individuals depending on bi
t:
i) People with bi
t < b bt vote against public education, hoping to get el.
ii) People with bi
t 2 [b bt;bt) vote for public education, hoping to get eh.
iii) People with bi
t ￿ bt vote against public education, hoping to get eh.
Therefore, now some proportion of people with low ability support public
secondary education in contrast with what happened in the previous peri-
ods. Those who are moderately poor are the additional group supporting
public education: as secondary schooling costs would decline with public
secondary education implemented, moderately poor ones do not want to
stop at secondary schooling and hope to get higher education under public
secondary education, in the hope of becoming top managers and hiring mid-
dle managers after graduation. On the other hand, highly poor ones vote
against public schooling because they cannot a⁄ord to get higher education
anyway and cannot become middle-skilled with secondary education, either.
In addition, relatively rich individuals do not support public education be-
cause they would pay less to get the same level of education without public
schooling.
Combining the above results for both high and low ability individuals,
poor people can a⁄ord to get higher education over time.
35we see that public secondary education is supported by people with high
ability who are also not very rich (ai = ah and bi
t < bt) as before. However,
there arises additional support for public education in this period: now low
ability individuals who are also neither very rich nor very poor (ai = al and
bi
t 2 [b bt;bt)) vote for public secondary education, too, as they look forward
to becoming top managers of three-layered ￿rms and hiring the optimal
number of middle managers.58 Note that those with bi
t ￿ bt do not support
public secondary education even in this period as rich people still prefer not
to pay the proportional tax required for sustaining public schooling.59 The
only group, among those who are not very rich, that does not support public
secondary education is those with ai = al and bi
t < b bt. These people do not
support public secondary education because they know that they cannot
a⁄ord college tuition anyway and getting only secondary education does not
give them a chance to ￿nd a better paying job. Furthermore, it is noteworthy
that while in the previous periods every individual with ai = ah and bi
t < bt
supported public secondary education hoping to become middle-skilled with
only secondary education, now some of them, speci￿cally with ai = ah and
bi
t 2 [b bt;bt), support public secondary education in the hope of becoming
top managers of three-layered ￿rms with higher education and hiring the
optimal number of middle managers. In summary, while people in support
of public education used to pursue only up to high school diplomas before,
now most supporters of public education pursue college diplomas hoping to
have enough people with zi = zm whom they can employ as their middle
managers.
As a result, if the number of people with ai = al and bi
t 2 [b bt;bt), the
58The reason that this key additional support for public education is from those who have
low ability is that high ability individuals with the same range of bequests have already
supported public education since the previous periods. In fact noting that b bt < K1+K2 <
bt now, we can also think of those with ai = ah and b
i
t 2 [b bt;bt) as an additional support
group for public education, because now they hope to get higher education and then
become top managers of ￿rms rather than getting only secondary education. Therefore,
our model does NOT imply that those who were pivotal in making successful the high
school movement in the early 20th century were all of low ability.
59This is in contrast with the result in Galor and Moav (2006) that support for public
education becomes unanimous even among rich capitalists in the end, and could be thought
of as an improvement on their work in a little more realistic direction.
36additional support group, is large enough, then public secondary education
has a chance to be implemented in this period. Note that the interval
[b bt;bt) expands over time, because as bt increases, ￿t = K1
bt decreases and
so b bt ￿ K2
1￿￿t also decreases. Therefore, it might be that this additional
support from low ability individuals who are moderately poor is enough for
the introduction of public education. However, this is possible only in the
later stage of this period, as b bt ; bt in the early stage.
If the outcome of the majority vote is the rejection of public secondary
education, which is a probable outcome in the earlier stage of this period,
we obtain exactly the same distribution of skill in the equilibrium as in the
previous sections: people with ai = ah and bi
t < K1 are forced to choose el as
their education level and so acquire zl as their skill level. People with ai = ah
and bi
t 2 [K1;K1+K2) choose em and so acquire zm as their skill level. Those
with ai = ah and bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 choose eh and so acquire zh as their skill
level. On the other hand, people with ai = al and bi
t < K1 + K2 choose el
and acquire zl as their skill level. Individuals with ai = al and bi
t ￿ K1+K2
want to get eh and as a result acquire a skill level zh: Hence there exist
all three levels of skill in the equilibrium. To ensure that every individual
with zi = zh can form a three-layered organization with the optimal number
of middle managers nm =
1￿zl
1￿zm (See Section 2), the ratio of people with
ai = ah and bi
t 2 [K1;K1 + K2) to people with bi
t ￿ K1 + K2 needs to be
greater than
1￿zl
1￿zm: In fact it is straightforward to show that this is really
the case if (A1) and (A2) hold. This result, which is similar to Proposition
4, is obtained because we can use exactly the same graph as Figure 4 except
that now K1 < b bt < K1 + K2 < bt, with only the positions of b bt and bt
interchanged.
Based on these considerations, the next proposition shows that public
education must start to be implemented during this period given the previ-
ous assumptions that we made.
Proposition 5 Given (A2), there exists a period t￿ when public secondary
education starts to be implemented during the period in which both ht+1 ￿
h￿￿ and bt > K1 + K2 hold.
37Proof. Suppose that until now public education has never been imple-
mented before, and that both ht+1 ￿ h￿￿ and bt > K1 + K2 hold. Then
based on the above discussion, we obtain the following expression for the
proportion of the population supporting public secondary education at time
t: Pr(ai = ah & bi
t < bt) + Pr(ai = al & bi
t 2 [b bt;bt)) = q Pr(bi
t <
bt) + (1 ￿ q)Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt)) by the independence between child￿ s ability
and parent￿ s ability or wealth.
Now note that bt increases over time to in￿nity as wh =
zh￿zl￿zmht+1(1￿zl)
ht+1(1￿zm)
goes to in￿nity and so does the long run level of bequests for descendants of
originally rich family given by
￿
1￿￿(wh ￿ K1 ￿ K2). Note also that the long
run level of bequests for descendants of originally non-rich family oscillates
between two exogenous values (See Figure 4 with the positions of b bt and bt





is monotonically decreasing from
K1 + K2 to K2 during this period as b bt = bt = K1 + K2 at the beginning
of this period and bt tends to in￿nity as time goes on. This implies that
Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt)) is non-decreasing over time, while Pr(bi
t < bt) remains equal




1￿￿(wh ￿ K1 ￿ K2)
￿
. There-
fore, the proportion of the population supporting public education at time
t, q Pr(bi
t < bt)+(1￿q)Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt)) = q(1￿￿R)+(1￿q)Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt))
is non-decreasing over time.
Also note that ￿(zl+K2) < K2 holds, as K1 > ￿(zl+K1) in (A2) implies
that K2 > ￿(zl+K1)+K2￿K1 = ￿(zl+K2)+(1￿￿)(K2￿K1) > ￿(zl+K2).
This implies that in Figure 4 (with the positions of b bt and bt interchanged),
the ￿(zl + bi
t) curve lies below the 45 degree line at bi
t = K2. On the other
hand, ￿(zm+K2) > ￿K1+K2 in (A2) is equivalent to ￿(zm+K2￿K1) > K2,
which implies that in Figure 4 (with the positions of b bt and bt interchanged),
the ￿(zm+bi
t￿K1) curve lies above the 45 degree line at bi
t = K2. Therefore,
Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt)) (and so q(1 ￿ ￿R) + (1 ￿ q)Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt))) is continuously
non-decreasing with b bt close to K2 past the point B in Figure 4 (with the
positions of b bt and bt interchanged), where a jump of the probability can
arise.
Based on these considerations, now suppose that public secondary edu-
38cation can never be implemented, which is equivalent to q (1 ￿ ￿R) + (1 ￿
q)Pr(bi
1 2 [K2;bt)) ￿ 1
2. A contradiction caused by this inequality would
prove that support for public secondary education becomes the majority
in ￿nite time t￿ by the continuity of q(1 ￿ ￿R) + (1 ￿ q)Pr(bi
t 2 [b bt;bt))
with b bt close enough to K2. The LHS of the above inequality is equal to
q (1 ￿ ￿R) + (1 ￿ q)q (1 ￿ ￿R) = (2 ￿ q)q (1 ￿ ￿R) from Figure 4 (with the
positions of b bt and bt reversed). Then (2 ￿ q)q (1 ￿ ￿R) ￿ 1
2 is equivalent to
￿R ￿ 1 ￿ 1
2q(2￿q), which contradicts the condition ￿R < 1 ￿ 1
2q(2￿q) given in
(A2). Q.E.D.
In Proposition 3, we have shown that even in the period when three-
layered ￿rms ￿nally emerge, public secondary education is still not imple-
mented when bt < K1 + K2 still holds. This is because public secondary
education in this period is supported only by those who want to become
only middle-skilled and there is no support whatsoever from those who want
to become top managers of three-layered ￿rms and hire middle-skilled in-
dividuals as their middle managers. Since the payo⁄s to low-skilled and
middle-skilled individuals remain unchanged at zl and zm apiece regardless
of time and occupational choices in our model, the long-run evolution of bt
depends only on that of the wages of high-skilled individuals as top managers
(See Figure 4). Then bt < K1 + K2 implies that the wages of high-skilled
individuals as top managers in three-layered ￿rms are still low due to com-
munication costs being not very low yet, and so those who demand higher
education to become high-skilled have few incentives to support public sec-
ondary education to have enough middle managers required for running
optimal three-layered organizations.
In contrast, Proposition 5 shows that public secondary education starts
to be implemented when bt > K1 + K2 holds. This is because now there
is enough extra support from those who want to be top managers in three-
layered ￿rms and hire the optimal number of middle managers. bt > K1+K2
implies that the wages of high-skilled individuals as top managers are now
high with communication costs having decreased enough, and so some of
those who demand higher education to become high-skilled now have huge
incentives to support public secondary education to have su¢ cient middle
39managers required for running optimal three-layered organizations. There-
fore, the results presented in Propositions 3 and 5 are consistent with the
quotations from Goldin (1999) and Goldin and Katz (2000) in the Introduc-
tion.60
If the outcome of the majority vote in the later stage of this period is
the implementation of public education,61 as implied by Proposition 5, it is
clear from Figure 5 that people with ai = ah and bi
t < b bt are forced to choose
em as their education level and so acquire zm as their skill level. Individuals
with ai = ah and bi
t ￿ b bt choose eh and so acquire zh as their skill level. On
the other hand, from Figure 6 it is straightforward to see that those with
ai = al and bi
t < b bt choose el or em and acquire zl as their skill level, while
agents with ai = al and bi
t ￿ b bt want to get eh and as a result acquire a skill
level zh. Hence, there exist all three levels of skill in the equilibrium.62
60The transition from the era in which there was no public secondary education, to the
era in which it is implemented, can be thought of as a historical example of the transition
from an oligarchic society to a democratic one presented in Acemoglu (2008). As a result of
mass public schooling there are now more people who can a⁄ord to get college education
and at least some of them, who did not have any chance to be top managers of ￿rms
before, now have the opportunity. This is similar to the lowering of entry barriers against
new entreprenuers in transition from an oligarchic to a democratic society in Acemoglu
(2008). An interesting question is whether this example could be thought of as supporting
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007) which argues that education causes democracy, while
refuting Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2005) which argues otherwise. This
seeming contradition might be because the de￿nition of democracy used by Acemoglu
(2008) is opposite to oligarchy, while that in the debate between Glaeser et al. (2007) and
Acemoglu et al. (2005) is the antonym of dictatorship.
61The later stage of this period could actually arrive rather quickly, as K1, the gap
between K1+K2 and K2, could be small and the majority of support for public secondary
education could start to appear well before b bt reaches K2. As a result, it might take only
a couple of generations for public secondary education to be implemented after knowledge
hierarchies of the most sophisticated form start to emerge, which is consistent with the
historical facts of the U.S.
62To ensure that every individual with zi = zh forms a three-layered organization with
the optimal number of middle managers nm =
1￿zl
1￿zm (See Section 2), the ratio of the
number of people with ai = ah and b
i
t < b bt to that of people with b
i
t ￿ b bt needs to
be greater than
1￿zl
1￿zm. Now we face an important question: Will there continue to be
enough middle-skilled individuals in the equilibrium so that three-layered ￿rms can be run
optimally, without any changes in the structure of the educational system under public
secondary schooling? Kim (2008) shows that the answer to the above question is "No,"
and argues that selective college admission using both academic and non-academic criteria,
as widely observed in the U.S., can be thought of as a solution to the problem. It also
shows that once public secondary education is implemented, those groups who originally
406 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have tried to theoretically connect two historical events in
the U.S. by causality: the emergence of knowledge hierarchies in the mod-
ern U.S. ￿rms in the late 19th century with huge progress in communication
technology, and the unprecedented and unparalleled expansion of public sec-
ondary education called the high school movement in the early 20th century.
Based on a number of theoretical and empirical studies regarding at least
one of the above two historical events, we have combined those rather frag-
mented elements into one consistent dynamic theory as presented in this
paper.
Based on an OLG model, the basic structure of which is presented in Sec-
tion 2 and in which the complementarity between individual skills is crucial
to production, we have ￿rst shown in Sections 3 and 4 that when there has
not yet emerged a sophisticated form of production organizations in which
middle managers play a very crucial role in bridging the top manager and
production workers to boost productivity signi￿cantly, public secondary ed-
ucation cannot be implemented as there is no demand for the middle-skilled
required for forming sophisticated knowledge hierarchies. The same result
applies, Section 5.1 shows, even when there has emerged a sophisticated
form of production organizations that hire middle managers but the attrac-
tiveness of being top managers is not very high yet compared to remaining
self-employed for the high-skilled individuals. This is because the extra sup-
port necessary for public secondary education to be implemented, from the
potential top managers for the purpose of having enough middle-skilled in-
dividuals required for optimally forming a sophisticated form of knowledge
hierarchies, is still not strong enough.
We have shown in Section 5.2, however, that public secondary educa-
tion can be ￿nally implemented when the payo⁄ to top managers gets high
enough compared to that of being self-employed for the high-skilled, as some
supported public secondary education continue to do so in subsequent generations and as
a result public secondary education continues to be implemented in the future.
41of potential top managers now have a strong incentive to support public sec-
ondary education as a way to have enough middle-skilled individuals in the
economy whom they can hire as middle managers in ￿rms. This predic-
tion of our model is consistent with the historical fact that the high school
movement took place in the U.S. in the early 20th century after a sophisti-
cated form of knowledge hierarchies had started to emerge in the late 19th
century.63
To brie￿ y mention a possible direction of future research, a theoretical
model answering the following questions would be a good complement to
this paper: Will there continue to be enough middle-skilled individuals in
the economy required for optimally running a sophisticated form of produc-
tion organizations with public secondary education implemented? And if
not, which change in the basic structure of the economy can correct the
problem? Is this theoretically identi￿ed solution consistent with historical
facts of the U.S.? Trying to ￿nd answers to these questions might reveal
further causal connections among key historical events in the U.S. since the
late 19th century, which would not have seemed related so much to one
another.64
63It should be emphasized that this paper does NOT argue that economic development
rather automatically leads to the adoption of better institutions in the end. On the con-
trary, we have focused on the case of the U.S., where democratic politics was already
deep-rooted in the periods covered in this paper. Our assumption that everyone partic-
ipates in a majority vote taking place every period regarding the introdcution of public
education, is crucial to deriving the results. For example, if the few descendants of the
originally rich families could unilaterally decide on the agenda, there would be no chance
for public education to get implemented (Remember that those with b
i
t ￿ bt never support
public schooling in any period in our model). Therefore, the democratic characterstic of
the U.S. is essential to our analysis and the results of this paper cannot be applied to
the case of countries with weak democratic foundations without explicitly considering the
political charateristics of those countries. In this sense, this paper is consistent with Grad-
stein￿ s (2008) view that the di⁄erence in the original political bias in countries can lead
to multiple equilibria in terms of institutional quality and economic development.
64See Kim (2008) for the ￿rst step in this direction.
42Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3
Proof of Lemma 2. i) Suppose that
q ￿
￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p






We are to show that this leads to a contradiction. This inequality is equiv-
alent to
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2 ￿ 1 + zm ￿ 2zl. Now focus on the
term inside the square root on the LHS. (4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2 =
z2
m +2(3￿4zl)zm +8z2





as given in (A1), because the determinant of the above quadratic form
(3￿4zl)2￿(8z2





is the greater root of the quadratic equation z2
m + 2(3 ￿ 4zl)zm + 8z2
l ￿
8zl + 1 = 0. Since 1 + zm ￿ 2zl = (1 ￿ zl) + (zm ￿ zl) > 0 from (2),
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2 ￿ 1+zm ￿2zl if and only if (4zl ￿zm ￿3)2 ￿
8(1￿zl)2 ￿ (1+zm￿2zl)2. It is straightforward to show that this inequality







￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2
4(1 ￿ zl)
;
so as to show that this leads to a contradiction. It is straightforward to show
that this inequality is equivalent to
2
p
2(1 ￿ zl) ￿ (1 ￿ zm) ￿
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2.
It is easy to see that the LHS is positive as 1￿zl > 1￿zm, and the term in
the square root on the RHS has already been shown to be positive with (A1).




2(1 ￿ zl) ￿ (1 ￿ zm)
￿2
￿
(4zl ￿zm ￿3)2 ￿8(1￿zl)2 holds, which after some algebraic manipulations
can be shown to be equivalent to (1 ￿ zm)(1 ￿ zl) ￿ 0. This inequality is a
contradiction to (2), which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. i) Suppose that 0 ￿ 1￿ 1
2q(2￿q). We are to show that
this leads to a contradiction. This inequality is equivalent to 2q2￿4q+1 ￿ 0,
43which holds true if and only if q ￿ 2￿
p
2
2 or q ￿ 2+
p
2




2 < q < q < 1
2 from (A1) and Lemma 2 proven based on
(A1).
ii) Supposed that 1￿ 1
2q(2￿q) ￿
(1￿zm)q
(1￿zl)+(1￿zm)q. We are to show that this
gives rise to a contradiction. It is straightforward to show that this inequality
is equivalent to 2(1 ￿ zl)q2 + (4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)q + (1 ￿ zl) ￿ 0. This inequality
holds if and only if both (4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2 = z2
m + 2(3 ￿ 4zl)zm +
8z2
l ￿ 8zl + 1 ￿ 0 and
￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p




￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) +
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2
4(1 ￿ zl)
hold. However,
￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2
4(1 ￿ zl)
￿ q
is a contradiction to
q < q ￿
￿(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3) ￿
p
(4zl ￿ zm ￿ 3)2 ￿ 8(1 ￿ zl)2
4(1 ￿ zl)
in (A1).
iii) It is straightforward to see that
(1￿zm)q
(1￿zl)+(1￿zm)q < 1
2, as 1 ￿ zl >
(1 ￿ zm)q. Q.E.D.
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Figure 2: High ability individuals' preferences regarding public secondary education depending   
                on the level of bequests, when  2 1 K K bt + < . The bold segments represent the    
                maximum second period income for each level of bequests. 
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Figure 3: Low ability individuals' preferences regarding public secondary education depending   
                on the level of bequests, when  2 1 K K bt + < . The bold segments represent the    





Figure 4: The evolution of bequests without public secondary education implemented. The long-   
                 run level of bequests for descendants of originally rich families keeps increasing, while   
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Figure 5: High ability individuals' preferences regarding public secondary education depending     
                on the level of bequests, when  2 1 K K bt + > . The bold segments represent the    






Figure 6: Low ability individuals' preferences regarding public secondary education depending   
                on the level of bequests, when  2 1 K K bt + > . The bold segments represent the    
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